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Abstract 
 Events happen within the organizational world not by chance but for reasons. It is surely the task of 
management research to try to explain why these events occur. This requires us to understand the 
nature of causality but, in general, this is seldom discussed in the management or IS literature. The 
standard, positivist view underlying statistical analysis is the Humean one of constant conjunctions of 
events leading to universal laws. Against this, many constructivists find the whole idea of external 
causality implausible. In this paper we explore a third alternative that is developing strongly within the 
philosophy of science, social theory and critical realism ± the mechanisms view. This proposes that 
events are generated through the interaction of specific mechanisms endowed with causal powers 
that may or may not be triggered, and may or may not be countervailed. In particular, the paper 
develops some of the fundamental concepts such as the nature of events, emergent properties, the 
difference between properties and powers, casual interactions between levels, absences as causes, 
event causality and generative causality, and abstracting causal regularities. The paper concludes by 
illustrating these ideas with a series of empirical case studies. 
Key Words: causality, mechanisms, emergent properties, powers 
1. Introduction
Things happen in and around organizations. The organizational world is a constant flux of unfolding 
events which involve people, technology, materials, money, power, social structures and ideas. One of 




that one does not think that they simply happen by chance, and their patterned nature makes this 
statistically inconceivable, then one has to assume that there is some form of causation at work. 
However, within the broad ambit of information systems and management research there are several, 
largely exclusive, conceptualizations of causation. Moreover, it is a subject that, until relatively 
recently, has been little discussed within the management literature. Most research is carried out 
within a particular paradigmatic silo ± positivist, constructivist, critical or realist ± making implicit, 
but seldom justified causative assumptions. 
Durand and Vaara (2009), in a stimulating paper, outline four general positions within the field of 
strategy although they can be applied equally to information systems. The positivist view that 
causation concerns empirically generated laws based on constant conjunctions of events; the 
constructionist1 view that management research is more concerned with interpretation than 
explanation and therefore talk of external causes is somewhat spurious; the (critical) realist view of 
generative causality through the interactions of powerful mechanisms; and the pragmatist view that 
judges causal beliefs in terms of their instrumental values. After an analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of these positions, they go on to distil four conditions that they claim are necessary for an 
understanding of causality: i) that causation needs to be distinguished from constant conjunctions or 
statistical association; ii) that causation results from a complex interplay of mechanisms and forces; 
LLL WKDWZHPXVW UHFRJQL]H WKH LPSRUWDQFHRIVRFLDO LQWHUYHQWLRQVDQGDFWRUV¶FRQVWUXFWLRQVDQG LY
that explanations have instrumental value depending on their explanatory power.  
7KHUHLVPXFK LQ'XUDQGDQG9DDUD¶VDSSURDFKZLWKZKLFKZHDJUHHDQGLQ WKLVSDSHUZHZLVKWR
develop from it, highlighting what we perceive as limitations and developing more fully a particular 
approach to causation. This approach has grown from three different disciplinary fields ± the 
philosophy of science, critical realism and systems thinking (Mingers, 2014). We shall call this 
DSSURDFKD³PHFKDQLVPV´YLHZRIFDXVDWLRQDVLWLVEDVHGRQWKHLGHDWKDWWKHHYHQWVZHREVHUYHDQG
experience are generated through the complex interactions of generative mechanisms (or systems) that 
have causal powers or tendencies. This approach has been developing strongly within the philosophy 
of science (Illari & Williamson, 2011) against the traditional hypothetico-deductive model which sees 
explanation as the deduction of consequences from general laws (covering law model). At the same 
WLPHDOWKRXJKGHYHORSHGLQGHSHQGHQWO\LWLVDPDMRUFRPSRQHQWRI%KDVNDU¶VFULWLFDOUHDOLVPDQGWKH
idea of a mechanism is essentially the same as a system with emergent properties and powers. We 
VKRXOG DOVRSRLQWRXW LQ FDVH WKH LGHDRI D ³PHFKDQLVP´ VRXQGVRYHUO\SK\VLFDOLVW WKDWJHQHUDWLYH
mechanisms or structures may be non-material, for example social structures, organizations, ideas, 
motivations and so on. In fact, anything that can be thought to have causal effects in the world. 
Moreover, there is not just one form of causation but many as Cartwright (1999, p. 119) argues ± 
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 We will use the terms constructionist and constructivist inter-changeably. 
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necessary conditions, sufficient conditions, agents, interventions, contraventions, modifications, 
enhancements, inhibitions etc. 
The structure of the paper is to first review perspectives on causality in IS research in order to identify 
the weaknesses with current conceptualizations and management research more generally. Our 
preferred alternative ± the CR mechanisms approach ± has already been used in IS research but there 
is D JRRG GHDO RI FRQIXVLRQ QRW OHDVW EHFDXVH RI %KDVNDU¶V GLIILFXOW DQG RIWHQ GHYHORSLQJ LGHDV
(Bhaskar, 1978, 1979, 1993, 2002; Bhaskar & Hartwig, 2010). The main purpose of the paper is to 
develop the approach in a clearer and more consistent manner to facilitate its use in practice. This 
involves, in Section 3, clarifying concepts such as events, emergent properties, the difference between 
properties and powers, and causal interactions between different organizational levels and absences as 
causes. We then, in Section 4, describe the basic braiding between event causality and underlying 
generative causality including the possibility of abstracting generic causal regularities out of the 
analysis of specific episodic event. This theoretical approach is illustrated with an analysis of a series 
of empirical CR case studies and recommendations for practice.  
2. Current perspectives on causation 
Although causality has not been much researched within IS, there are some significant contributions 
that should be mentioned. One of the earliest was that of Markus and Robey (1988) who suggested 
three dimensions for the causal structure of theories: causal agency, logical structure and level of 
analysis. Before discussing these we should note that they are analyzing the causal structure of 
theories rather than discussing the nature of actual causation per se. Nevertheless, to the extent that 
theories are good theories, we should expect that their content corresponds with reality in some way.  
In terms of the three dimensions, causal agency includes three possibilities ± technology-driven, actor-
driven or emergent from a combination of both. Logical structure distinguishes between variance 
theories, which are essentially theories that relate outcomes to necessary and sufficient conditions at 
the same time (many statistical models are of this form), and process theories which look at 
FRQWLQJHQW FDXVDO FRQQHFWLRQV EHWZHHQ HYHQWV ³FKDQJHV RI VWDWH´ LQ WKHLU WHUPV over time. This 
distinction is similar to the event/generative causality distinction we will make later. Level of analysis 
can be macro (society or organization), micro (individuals) or both. Although this was a useful 
framework in its time, it does not really capture more recent theoretical and philosophical 
developments, and is not directed primarily at causality. 
Moving to Durand and Vaara (2009), we will analyze their four forms of causation.  
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2.1. Positivism/ empiricism  
It is still plausible to suggest that the dominant perspective in IS research is positivism despite the 
growth of qualitative, interpretive, critical and even post-modern research paradigms. For this reason, 
we will begin by looking at the assumptions made about causation within positivist research. 
Interestingly, the assumptions are inevitably made, but seldom discussed or even recognized. The 
standard view of the logic of explanation is the hypothetico-deductive model developed in the natural 
sciences (Hollis, 2002; Manicas, 2006; Rosenberg, 2008). The world is assumed to be governed by 
universal, general laws and science proceeds by uncovering these laws through repeated observations 
which lead, by way of induction, to a hypothetical law. Deduction is then used to make predictions 
from the laws and attempts are made then to observe the predictions and thus confirm or falsify the 
hypothesis. Generally, such laws are stochastic rather than deterministic and so statistical analysis of 
the data is necessary particularly, in management and econometrics, regression, structural equation 
modelling (SEM) or vector autoregression (VAR). Only events that are observable, and preferably 
measurable in some way, can form the basis of scientific analysis. 
This view of deductive explanation rests on a particular philosophical understanding of causation 
formulated by David Hume (1978 (orig. 1739)), namely a constant conjunction of events. Hume was 
an empiricist and a sceptic and accepted as real only that which could be directly perceived. He 
therefore argued that, when we regularly see one event followed by another, e.g., a hammer driving a 
nail, and we say the hammer caused the movement of the nail we cannot mean anything more than 
that one event is always followed by another in a constant conjunction. There cannot be more to 
causation than that; there cannot be any further explanation in terms of something underlying or 
unobservable: 
We may define a CAUSE to be 'An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all 
the objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to 
those objects that resemble the latter.' (p. 221) 
 
Thus causation involves essentially two relations ± precedence, one object or event must occur before 
the other, and contiguity, the objects must touch spatially. And, to distinguish causation from mere 
chance or coincidence, the conjunction must be constant ± it must happen on each occurrence of 
similar circumstances.  
Hume also suggested that, to the extent we think of causation as more than this, it is merely a 
psychological habit or custom that we have become used to: 
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Again, when I consider the influence of this constant conjunction, I perceive, that such a 
relation can never be an object of reasoning, and can never operate upon the mind, but by 
means of custom, which determines the imagination to make a transition from the idea of one 
object to that of its usual attendant, and from the impression of one to a more lively idea of 
the other. (p. 221) 
 
And second, that this is indeed, for Hume, the only possible way of conceiving causation: 
³«H[SHULHQFHRQO\WHDFKHVXVKRZRQHHYHQWFRQVWDQWO\IROORZVDQRWKHUZLWKRXWLQVWUXFWLQJ
us in the secret connexionZKLFKELQGVWKHPWRJHWKHUDQGUHQGHUVWKHPLQVHSDUDEOH´ 
Hume 1967  
Thus the basic notion of causality that underpins positivism, and all the statistical analysis that goes 
with it, is one of simple event regularities. All that we can hope for in science is constant conjunctions 
of empirically observable and measurable events. Pearson, one of the founders of modern statistics, 
actually banned the notion of causation and he never again used the term causation in his work, 
declaring,  ³>R@QFHWKHUHDder realizes the nature of such a table [a contingency table], he will have 
grasped the essence of the conception of association between cause and effect´ TXRWHG LQ3HDUO 83: 
340).  Equally, Hendry (1990, p. 184), a world-IDPRXV HFRQRPHWULFLDQ DFFHSWHG WKDW ³I am a 
Humean in that I believe we cannot perceive necessary connections in reality. All we can do is set up 
D WKHRUHWLFDO PRGHO LQ ZKLFK ZH GHILQH WKH ZRUG µFDXVDOLW\¶ SUHFLVHO\ DV HFRQRPLVWV GR ZLWK \  
f(x´  
The problem is, that this is an extremely reductive and limited form of causation. We cannot really 
ask why things happen, or go beneath the surface of empirically observable conjunctions of events to 
discover the reasons for them (Bhaskar, 1978). 
2.2. Interpretivism/ constructionism 
Constructionists reject the Humean approach to causality as constant conjunctions leading to general 
laws because they view the social world as constituted by human meaning and see the main task of 
research as exploring and understanding subjective human viewpoints (Smith, 2006). From this 
perspective it becomes very difficult to have any approach to causality as objective since all 
explanations are merely personal or group viewpoints and haYHWREHMXGJHGDVHTXDOO\YDOLG³there 
are no correct and incorrect theories but there are interesting and less interesting ways to view the 




7R WKH H[WHQW WKDW LQWHUSUHWLYLVW UHVHDUFKHUV GR LQYRNH FODLPV RI FDXVDOLW\ WKHQ  ³explanations are 
causal, but not in the positivists' uni-directional sense; neither are they sought for the same purpose. 
Interpretive researchers posit circular or reciprocally interacting models of causality, with the 
intention of understanding actors' views of their social world and their role in it´ (Orlikowski & 
Baroudi, 1991, p. 14). 
In practice, this position, taken strongly, is in many ways contradictory. Researchers do in fact make 
many ontological assumptions about the existence of people, organizations and technology, and they 
do theorize about the reasons why actors hold certain beliefs and the effects that they may have 
(Avgerou, 2013). This becomes very difficult without an alternative view of causality to the 
positivistic one that is rejected. It also makes the idea of any form of generalization very difficult and 
yet this is accepted by many interpretivist researchers (Lee & Baskerville, 2012; Lee & Hovorka, 
2015; Walsham, 1995). As we shall see, we would argue that a way out of these dilemmas is the non-
positivist form of causation offered by the mechanisms approach. Indeed, this is also suggested by 
Avgerou (2013) in a very interesting paper proposing a mechanisms based approach specifically for 
interpretive research. We will discuss this more below. 
2.3. Realism  
'XUDQGDQG9DDUD¶Vcall the final two approaches to causation realist and pragmatist respectively but 
we do not agree with their characterization of either of these. Their description of a realist approach 
FOHDUO\VWHPVIURP%KDVNDU¶V(1978, 1979, 1993) critical realism (CR) which itself developed in part 
from Harre and Madden (Harre & Madden, 1975). This is based on a fundamental stratification of 
UHDOLW\ LQWR WKH GRPDLQV RI WKH ³UHDO´ WKH ³DFWXDO´ DQG WKH ³HPSLULFDO´ 7KH UHDO LV WKH H[WHUQDO
intransitive world of mechanisms and structures that have properties and causal powers leading them 
to behave in particular ways. The interaction of these mechanisms, at different levels, generates the 
events that actually occur, or do not occur even though expected, forming the domain of the actual. 
Finally, a small subset of all the actual events is observed and recorded to become the empirical 
material of scientific research. 
7KLV IRUP RI FDXVDOLW\ LV RIWHQ FDOOHG ³JHQHUDWLYH FDXVDOLW\´ DQG LV TXLWH GLIIHUHQW IURP +XPHDQ
causality. The events of the world that we observe and experience are generated by the interaction of 
systems or mechanisms which have their own particular structures and enduring causal powers. These 
powers may, at any particular time, not be exercised because they need triggering by particular 
circumstances or interactions; or they may be exercised but not result in any change because they are 
countervailed by some other mechanisms. We will consider these in much more detail later but we 
would just highlight two other important aspects (not mentioned by Durand and Vaara): that absences 
can be causes, and that human agents are obvious examples of mechanisms with causal powers. 
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This leads to a methodology based on abduction rather than (or perhaps as well as2) induction or 
deduction. We make observations of the empirical world and then hypothesize possible generative 
mechanisms that could, if they existed, explain them. We then gather evidence to help us choose 
between them and identify the actually operative mechanisms. This approach rests on a transcendental 
argument ± given how we experience the world, what must be the case in order to generate these 
experiences? 
This critical realist view of causality has been employed in many management fields (Ackroyd & 
Fleetwood, 2000; Edwards, O'Mahoney, & Vincent, 2014) including marketing (Easton, 2010), 
information systems (Mingers, Mutch, & Willcocks, 2013; Volkoff & Strong, 2013; Wynn & 
Williams, 2012; Zachariadis, Scott, & Barrett, 2013), strategy (Kwan & Tsang, 2001; Tsang & Kwan, 
1999; Watson, 2011)and organizational behavior (Reed, 2009; Vincent, 2008). 
Durand and Vaara propose two criticisms of critical realism ± ZKDW WKH\ WHUP ³LQRSHUDWLYH
WUDQVFHQGHQWDOLVP´DQGDQLQDELOLW\WRUHIOHFWRn the role of the researcher. Considering the first, the 
criticism is that it leads to such a complex mixture of actual and potential, operative and inoperative, 
causal mechanisms that it is not in practice possible to disentangle them. It seems to me that this is not 
really a valid criticism ± the world is indeed complex and in trying to understand and explain it we 
may well have to consider multiple and inter-related causal possibilities. That it is difficult, and often 
fallible, does not mean that we should not attempt it. The second is strange indeed as among research 
methodologies CR is perhaps ablest to do this. First, because it recognizes that observations are 
always mediated, relative to historical, cultural and ultimately individual circumstances, and never 
pure reflection of reality. And second because is rejects the dichotomy between facts and values 
arguing that social science is unavoidably value-full and committed (Mingers, 1997). 
2.4. Pragmatism 
Durand and Vaara call on pragmatism as the next approach, partly in response to the criticisms 
discussed above. They see two main benefits of (Peircean) pragmatism (Peirce, 1905): against 
positivism, that it recognizes that you cannot completely separate observations of events from our 
meaningful interpretation of them. And against CR, that the abductive methodology generates 
NQRZOHGJHWKDW³is not objective in the traditional sense, but is context-specific and dependent on the 
perspective of the researcher´S+RZHYHUERWKWKHVHSRLQWVZRXOGEHDFFHSWHGE\DQGVHHQ
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 Peirce (1907), who developed the concept of abduction,  saw scientific research as a combination of all three. 
8 
 
DV SDUW RI FULWLFDO UHDOLVP ,QGHHG &5¶V PHWKRGRORJ\ LV DFWXDOO\ EDVHG RQ DEGXFWLRQ DOWKRXJK
generDOO\FDOOHGE\%KDVNDU³UHWURGXFWLRQ´3.  
Durand and Vaara conclude with four conditions constituting a grounding for causation: i) Causation 
must be distinguished from constant conjunctions and statistical association. ii) Causation results from 
a complex of interacting mechanisms. iii) The importance of the interventions and constructions of 
social actors must be recognized. iv) Causal explanations have instrumental value dependent on their 
H[SODQDWRU\SRZHU³WKHUH¶VQRWKLQJPRUHSUDFWLFDOWKDQDJRRGWKHRU\´. 
We would agree with all of these, but claim that they are all integral to critical realism. 
2.5. Other categorizations within IS 
Within these very broad, and to some extent exclusive, research approaches, more specific forms of 
explanation have been identified. Hovorka et al (2008) discussed four forms: covering-law, statistical-
relevance (SR), contrast-class and functional. The covering-law model is essentially the deductive-
nomological (DN) approach of Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) where particular occurrences are 
deduced from general laws. The SR approach (Salmon, 1971) is the basis of most modern statistical 
analyses which seek to identify statistical relationships between various factors and the probability of 
occurrence of the phenomena to be explained. The contrast-class explanation (Van Fraassen, 1980), 
which can also be seen as the pragmatist view, recognizes that there may be several different 
explanations of the same phenomena dependent on the particular purposes or interests of the 
questioner. The functionalist form (Markus, 2004), which has been much criticized, explains the 
occurrence of phenomena in terms of the contribution they make to a wider system. This covers much 
of the technological design research. Hovorka et al (2008) surveyed the occurrence of these four 
explanation types in IS research and found that 75% of the papers used SR explanation, but as 93% of 
the papers were positivist that is not particularly surprising. Salmon (1998), the originator of the SR 
model, has actually moved to a causal mechanisms approach. 
Gregor and Hovorka (2011) also argue that causality is a much neglected subject. They recognize that 
there are many different approaches to causality but wish to maintain a basically realist ontology 
(against constructivism) and reject extreme relativism, asserting that it is possible to judge between 
viewpoints on the basis of better arguments (Toulmin, 1958).   
They distinguish six approaches to causality, four drawn from Kim (2011), but some are just variants 
of others. 
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A1: Regularity analysis. This is essentially the constant conjunctions of events view. 
A2: Probabilistic analysis. This is a form of non-deterministic regularity analysis. The lack of a 
closed system and unknown or unmeasurable effects mean that causal statements can only be 
made probabilistically. 
B1: Manipulation analysis. This involves the deliberate (or perhaps accidental) actions of an agent 
bringing something about. The cause is an event that we can manipulate to create an effect, e.g., 
choosing a particular option in some software (Woodward, 2003). 
B2: Mental (substantival) causation. This is really a variant of manipulation analysis but 
particularly concerns the creation of new objects or instruments. It involves the agents beliefs and 
ideas (Goldkuhl, 2004; Pearl, 2000). 
C: Counterfactual analysis. This form of analysis argues that A is a cause of B if it is the case that, 
if A had not occurred then B would not have occurred. In other words, A is a necessary (but not 
sufficient) cause of B (Lewis, 1973). This is related to manipulation analysis in that one can 
deliberately bring about the occurrence or non-occurrence. 
D: Enabling causal conditions. This approach focusses on the way in which particular 
characteristics of a mechanism, especially a designed artefact, may encourage or hinder 
subsequent actions. It can be formulated in terms of affordances (Gibson, 1977; Volkoff & 
Strong, 2013). 
Gregor and Hovorka go on to relate these forms of causal analysis to IS research in particular and, in a 
later paper, to design science (Gregor, Müller, & Seidel, 2013).   
3. The mechanisms view in general 
The central idea of causation within critical realism is easy to state (Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson, 
& Norrie, 1998; Bhaskar, 1978, 1979). Events, that is changes, that occur do so as a result of the 
interaction of relatively enduring mechanisms that have particular properties or causal powers. The 
mechanisms are not necessarily physical but could be social, psychological or conceptual, and may or 
may not be observable (Bunge, 2004) 7KLV ³PHFKDQLVPV´ YLHZ RI FDXVDOLW\ KDV EHHQ GHYHORSLQJ
within the philosophy of science as well as critical realism as an alternative to the traditional 
Hempelian (Hempel, 1965) deductive-nomological (D-N) model of science (Gerring, 2007; Glennan, 
1996; Glennan, 2002; Machamer, 2004; Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Salmon, 1998; Symons, 
2008). Apart from avoiding many of the problems besetting the D-N model, especially concerning 
induction, the idea of mechanisms fits much better with the actual practices of scientists (Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen, 2005) and with explanations in everyday life (Mingers, 2014). 
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The mechanism approach has also been developing within social science (Gorski, 2013). Hedstrom 
and Swedberg (1996) argued that mechanisms were the appropriate form of middle-range theories and 
identified three types ± situational mechanisms that link macro level (society or organization) to micro 
level (individual); individual action mechanisms that link desires and beliefs with action opportunities 
at the micro level; and transformational mechanisms that link individual actions into wider intended 
or unintended effects at the macro level. They gave as examples the self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 
1948), network diffusion (Coleman, Katz, & Menzel, 1957), and threshold-based behavior 
(Granovetter, 1978) and showed that all of these actually embody the same underlying mechanism. 
Gross (2009) surveyed the use of mechanisms in social science and identified five different 
approaches including critical realist. He suggested that the use of mechanisms was actually very 
common but often implicitly without an explicit description of the mechanism (Smith, 2006). His own 
approach was based on American pragmatists such as Peirce (1992 ) and Dewey (1938) which is, as 
we shall see, is one of the sources of CR. 
Astbury and Leeuw (2010) considered mechanisms within the context of evaluation studies. They 
built on Pawson DQG7LOOH\¶V(1997) work (which was itself based on critical realism) and identified 
three characteristics of mechanisms: that they are usually hidden and need to be uncovered in some 
ZD\ ³RSHQLQJ WKHEODFNER[´ WKDW WKH\DUH VHQVLWLYH WRGLIIHUHQW FRQWH[WV DQG WKDW WKH\JHQHUDWH
outcomes oUHIIHFWV$WKLUGVRXUFHDOWKRXJKKHGLGQRWXVHWKHWHUPPHFKDQLVPLV6HQJH¶V (2006) 
idea of systems archetypes ± SDUWLFXODUFRPELQDWLRQVRIIHHGEDFNSURFHVVHVVXFKDV³VXFFHVVWRWKH
VXFFHVVIXO´ RU³OLPLWVWRJURZWK´, that occur in many different context. 
Finally, Avgerou (2013) has advocated the use of social mechanisms in social theory based IS 
research. Her idea is very similar to ours except in two significant ways: first, that she does not draw 
on critical realism in formulating her approach and, second, that she appeals to interpretivist (as 
opposed to positivist) researchers although she then finds difficulty in convincing them to accept the 
reality of causal mechanisms. $YJHURX IUDPHV KHU DSSURDFK XVLQJ 0DUNXV DQG 5REH\¶V (1988) 
distinction between variance models that are essentially Humean and statistical, and process models 
that seek logical links in terms of events and actions. As Avgerou says: 
³7KXV WKH GHYHORSPHQt of explanation in interpretive IS research faces the difficulty of 
searching for causal processes of meaning making and action in the context-dependent 
XQIROGLQJRIG\QDPLFLQWHUDFWLRQVRISHRSOHZLWKWHFKQRORJ\´(p. 403) 
 
We suggest that the use of CR would actually alleviate the problem she faces. We argue that CR 
provides a sound underpinning for a mechanisms-based view of causality. CR provides a well-
developed and comprehensive philosophical position that has mechanisms at its heart. It accepts the 
inevitable concept- and activity-dependence of social action, and thus the necessity of interpretation 
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and hermeneutics, without committing the epistemic fallacy of restricting the ontology of the world to 
our conceptualizations of it. It has a place for both statistical analysis and meaningful interpretation 
(Mingers & Willcocks, 2014; Mingers & Willcocks, 2017). 
4. Developing the critical realist interpretation 
:H FDQ EHJLQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ &5¶V YLHZ RI PHFKDQLVPV ZLWK & 6 3HLUFH¶V (1958)  concept of 
³DEGXFWLRQ´ 7KLV ZDV D WKLUG IRUP RI ORJLF FRPSOHPHQWDU\ WR LQGXFWLRQ DQG GHGXFWLRQ (Psillos, 
2009)  ³$EGXFWLRQ FRQVLVWV LQ VWXG\LQJ IDFWV DQG GHYLVLQJ D WKHRU\ WR H[SODLQ WKHP´ (5.145) and  
³DEGXFWLRQ LV WKHSURFHVVRI IRUPLQJDQH[SODQDWRU\K\SRWKHVLV´ (5.171). Thus, with abduction we 
begin with some particular occurrence that is perhaps unexpected, or does not agree with current 
theories, and we then imagine some possible theory or hypothesis that would explain the event. So, 
we are neither going from empirical examples to a general rule (induction) nor going from a rule or 
law to consequences (deduction) but instead generating a plausible explanation. More recently, this 
approach has EHHQ FDOOHG LQ SKLORVRSK\ ³LQIHUHQFH WR WKH EHVW H[SODQDWLRQ´ (Lipton, 2004) and 
³UHWURGXFWLRQ´E\%KDVNDU(1978). With CR, the particular form that these hypotheses take is potential 
generative mechanisms which, if they did indeed exist, would account for the observed events.  
This relates to the fundamental distinction within CR between the domains of the real, which includes 
the actual which in turn contains the empirical (Bhaskar, 1978). The real is the domain of enduring 
causal generative mechanisms; the actual is the domain of transient events generated by the 
interactions of real mechanisms; the empirical is the subset of actual events observed and recorded for 
scientific purposes. 
Mechanisms have a number of characteristics: 
Mechanisms exist in a real, ontological sense independently of how they may be known or described 
by observers. They are stratified, in the sense of depth or hierarchy, and they may be physical, social, 
or conceptual. They may be observable or unobservable. Their existence is judged by a causal rather 
than a perceptual criteria ± i.e., that they have causal effects in the world.  
Mechanisms are relatively enduring in respect of the events that they cause but their absolute 
timescale may vary immensely. They have powers or tendencies, by virtue of their structural 
properties, to behave in particular ways or have certain effects. These powers may not be exercised all 
the time (perhaps needing to be triggered), or they may be exercised but have no effect because of the 
countervailing actions of some other mechanism. Through their interactions, mechanisms generate the 
actual occurrences and events of the world, only some of which are observed or noted empirically 
(Bhaskar, 1979, p. 170). Thus a mechanism may be said to consist of a structure of inter-related parts 
together with the powers or tendencies that the structure possesses. 
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Social structures or mechanisms have different properties or characteristics to physical ones (Bhaskar, 
1979). First, they only become manifest at all through the activities that they govern. That is, social 
structures cannot be directly observed, they exist only virtually as a set of practices or roles which 
govern or enable social activities ± think of language as an example. Through these activities the 
structures become reproduced or indeed changed and transformed. Second, they rely to some degree 
on the knowledge and understanding of social actors who must be aware that they are doing a 
particular activity, and how to do it. Third, they are localized in time and space in the sense that they 
belong to particular cultures at particular times rather than being universal, apart perhaps from 
extremely general ones such as the human ability to use tools or language. Finally, social systems are 
inevitably open (rather than being able to be closed as in a laboratory experiment) and hence, in 
principle unpredictable. 
Human beings are also clearly examples of generative mechanisms. They have a whole range of often 
complex powers to bring about various events, some being physical but others being cognitive, 
emotional or creative.  
We should situate the idea of mechanisms within an overall critical realist research approach. 
%KDVNDU¶VEDVLFPRGHOIRUVFLHQWLILFUHVHDUFKKDVILYHVWDJHV'5(,&(Bhaskar, 1993, 2014) This has 
been extended to cover applied research to RRREIC (Bhaskar, 2010) (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
These rather bare descriptions have been developed by several authors into more substantive 
procedures. Raduescu and Vessey (2008) have analyzed the three most common ones, those of 
$UFKHU¶V(1995) PRUSKRJHQHWLFDSSURDFK'DQHUPDUNHWDO¶V(2002) six stage model and Pawson and 
7LOOH\¶V(1997) realistic evaluation framework. Within IS, Wynn and Williams (2012) have proposed 
a methodology specifically tailored to IS case studies, and Raduescu and Vessey (2009) have 
examined the importance of domain theories within CR methodology. 
In the rest of this section we will describe and clarify the main concepts that form the critical realist 
view of causation. These are events, emergence, properties and powers, interactions between levels 
and absences as causes. Then, in the next section, we will put these together to give an overall account 
of causality as a braiding or intertwining of two forms ± event causality and generative causality 
evaluated in terms of retrodiction and retroduction respectively.  
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4.1. Events: the actual and the real 
Before elaborating on causal mechanisms themselves, we need to move to the other side to consider 
the events that mechanisms generate. In critical realism this is the distinction between the domains of 
the Real and the Actual. In philosophical terms, there is a degree of debate about the nature of an 
³HYHQW´(Casati & Varzi, 2002). Are they the same as or different to objects? Are there different kinds 
of events? Can there be static events or are all events time-bound? We broadly follow the approach of 
Quine (1970) and Goodman (1951) that objects and events are different but intrinsically related.   
In general, the distinctions between objects (not necessarily physical) and events is that objects are 
³FRQWLQXDQWV´ WKH\H[LVW LQDQG WKURXJKWLPHSHUVLVWHQWO\EXWHYHQWVDUH³RFFXUUDQWV´ WKH\ WDNHXS
time and may have different stages. Thus, an event has two aspects ± a particular duration, a start and 
finish time, and some element of change in something; if nothing changes there is no event. We 
should note in passing that an absence may be an event ± the missed train or the missed appointment ± 
where something was expected to occur but did not. If we begin with the idea of change, then what 
can it be a change of? Well, there is nothing other than the objects and structures in the domain of the 
Real that could change. There cannot be some other, ontologically distinct kind of thing. Thus events 
are just changes to existing entities. These changes could be to a single entity, for example a change in 
structure, and thus properties, or perhaps the generation or disintegration of the entity, or they could 
involve the interaction of several entities.  
What is perhaps most important is the timeframe defining the event. We tend to think in terms of 
human timescales ± births, deaths and marriages ± but subatomic events take only nanoseconds while 
cosmic events may take billions of years. So there is no absolute time for an event ± it depends on the 
nature of the event itself. But it also depends on the observer and their purpose in recording the event 
± we carve events out of the ongoing flux according to our interests. So we could consider the credit 
crunch as a single event, and look at its causes or effects, if we took a long view; or we could see it as 
an enduring mechanism spawning a variety of events if we took a week-by-week view.  
Thus the picture that we have is of a variety of entities interacting with each other at a variety of 
hierarchical levels. The changes that occur to the entities we can call events depending on our 
viewpoint. Some of these entities form relatively enduring wholes through the continual, morphostatic 
interactions of their components. These entities also have more fleeting interactions in a contingent 
and short-lived way but the essence of the causal relationship is essentially the same. 
4.2. Causality as an emergent property 
In principle, the causal powers or properties of a mechanism result as an emergent property of the 
mechanism. Emergent properties themselves are seen as consequences of the structure of the entity ± 
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that is its component parts and their processes and relationships. Emergence is a long-standing 
concept within philosophy and is at the heart of the holism/reductionism debates. Elder-Vass (2005; 
2010) has written a good explanation of emergence and a defense of emergent properties from a CR 
point of view and, in the main, we will follow his analysis. 
An emergent property or power (we will discuss the difference later) is a property that is possessed by 
an entity as a whole but not by its parts. The emergent property results from the properties and 
relations of the parts. Many discussions of emergence assume physical systems but the concept can 
also be applied to social or cognitive ones. For example, the behavior of an economic market is an 
emergent property of the interactions of its buyers and sellers. Emergence implies a hierarchy of 
levels of systems. At any particular level, a system can be analyzed into its component sub-systems 
and their relations. These in turn can be further analyzed into components and so on down to the most 
basic forces. However, against reductionism, each level has its own degree of autonomy since it 
generates new properties which do not exist at the lower levels. A system is constituted by its 
structure of parts and relationships. 
Elder-Vass distinguishes between systems with emergent properties which have what he terms 
³VLJQLILFDQW´ VWUXFWXUHV DQG V\VWHPV WKDW KDYH RQO\ resultant properties because they have no 
significant structure. These are sometimes FDOOHG³KHDSV´(Laszlo, 1972). Examples of heaps might be 
relatively arbitrary conVWUXFWVVXFKDV³DOOWKHJUDLQVRIULFHLQ&KLQD´ZKLFKGRQRWKDYHDQ\DFWXDO
relations; or properties of systems which are resultant rather than emergent since they are simply the 
sum of the properties of the parts ± for example the weight of some grains of rice (which is a property 
of both the parts and the whole) or the average height of a group of people (which is a property only 
of the whole).  
Elder-Vass also proposes a compositional view of emergence. This means that a system has its 
emergent properties and powers simply by virtue of its own structure. It does not require any other 
components, which do not necessarily belong to it, to exhibit its properties. This leads to a view of 
discrete bounded systems, each with their own particular properties or powers, dependent only on 
their own structures. There are two issues with this approach, particularly within the context of social 
systems. The first is that boundaries in social systems may not be easy to identify, or indeed be non-
existent. Or they may be identified differently by different observers (Mingers, 2014). Although clear-
cut boundary elements may not be identifiable, nevertheless social mechanisms do form for relatively 
enduring periods of time through processes of mutual influence and reinforcing causal relations. 
The second is that some of the system¶s powers may actually only be realized in combination with 
some other mechanism(s), or may be inhibited by another mechanism. For example, in nature there 
are many examples of symbiotic relationships in which at least one of the organisms could not exist 
without the presence of the other. The same may be true with organizations (Amar, 2001; Modig, 
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2007). They may develop to take advantage of a particular market opportunity, technology, software 
such as Google or Windows,  or perhaps even just a project and no longer be sustainable when the 
situation changes. The same can be true of mechanisms within organizations. For example, 
Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) identified mechanisms, such as an innovation mechanism and an 
adoption mechanism, that were both necessary in order to be successful.  
Elder-Vass (2010) identifies another type of example ± the power of water to put out a fire which is 
clearly only realized if there is a fire. However, this seems different. While it is true that water has 
certain properties (being cold and inflammable) that would put out a fire, would we want to say that is 
a power of water or merely an effect that happens if particular circumstances arise? This suggests that 
we should distinguish between properties or powers that are intrinsic to the mechanism regardless of 
its interactions, e.g., mass density or compressibility, and those that only occur within a particular 
interaction.  We will discuss this later in terms of the mechanism and its context. 
4.3. Properties and powers  
In this section we wish to clarify the differences, if any, between terms such as property and power. In 
WKH FULWLFDO UHDOLVW OLWHUDWXUH DQG SDUWLFXODUO\ %KDVNDU¶V RZQ ZRUN WKH\ WHQG WR EH XVHG VRPHZKDW
indiscriminately. Within philosophy, there is also a debate over whether powers and properties are the 
same. In positivism, causation is generally seen in terms of universal laws applied to rather inert 
objects but, as we have seen, in the mechanisms approach entities are seen as complex active systems 
with their own intrinsic powers (Chakravartty, 2008).  
Considering properties and powers, we have seen that properties are the characteristics, attributes or 
EHKDYLRUVRIDV\VWHPZKLFKUHVXOWIURPWKHV\VWHP¶VVWUXFWXUHFRQVWLWXWHd by parts and their relations. 
For example, incompressibility is a property of water, indeed any liquid. Power is generally taken to 
PHDQWKHDELOLW\WRDIIHFWRUFKDQJHVRPHWKLQJLQWKHH[WHUQDOHQYLURQPHQWWKXV³ZDWHUKDVWKHSRZHU
WRSXWRXWILUH´ 
Several authors hold the view that properties are essentially the same as powers. For instance, Elder-
Vass (2010, p.17) VD\V ³3URSHUWLHV DQG SRZHUV PD\ WKHUHIRUH EH UHJDUGHG DV V\QRQ\PV´
Chakravarrty (2008, p.154) VD\V ³, ZLOO XVH WKHVH WHUPV >FDXVDO SRZHU GLVSRVLWLRQ FDSDFLW\@
synonymously, to refer to properties of things in virtue of which they behave in particular ways in 
SDUWLFXODU FLUFXPVWDQFHV´ $QG %KDVNDU DOWKRXJK QRW JHQHUDOO\ YHU\ H[SOLFLW DERXW LW VD\V ³7KH
RQWRORJLFDOEDVHVRISRZHUVDUHMXVWWKHSURSHUWLHVWKDWDFFRXQWIRUWKHP´(Archer, et al., 1998, p. 72). 
Others, however, say they are distinct but related.  Fleetwood (2009) suggests that there are those who 
give primacy to powers, e.g., Mumford (2008), Chakravartty (2008) and possibly Bhaskar; those who 
give primacy to properties, e.g., Bird (2008) and Mackie (1977); and those, including Fleetwood, who 
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see neither as primary but both as intrinsically linked, e.g., Cartwright(1997) and Shoemaker (1997). I 
follow the latter group in that I argue that properties and powers are distinct, as we will see below, but 
that both come into being at the same time as characteristics of the particular thing or entity (the 
³WKLQJ´RU³HQWLW\´PD\RIFRXUVHQRWEHSK\VLFDO. 
We suggest that a property is a characteristic of an entity or system that exists independently of other 
systems dependent only on the structure of the system. It may or may not be observed, or observable, 
and it may or may not be exercised at any particular time. In contrast, a power is the ability to 
generate or cause change in some other system. A power is thus relational ± it describes the relation 
between a system and some other system or environment. A particular power depends on the 
properties of the system but also on the properties of the affected system. So, for example, water has 
the power to dissolve some substances such as salt and sugar (although in different ways) but not 
others such as oil or plastic. So the power of a mechanism to produce an outcome depends firstly on 
the properties of the mechanism and secondly on the context within which it operates. In terms of the 
relationship between the power and the property there can be multiple ± a single property can generate 
a single power; several properties may be necessary to generate the power; or a single property may 
generate several powers. 
We can illustrate with the example of a knife which has the power to cut things. For something to be a 
knife (or be used as a knife) there are two essential properties ± it must have a sharp edge and a 
certain degree of hardness. The sharpness of the edge creates a high degree of pressure and the 
hardness is necessary to push through the material to be cut. Whether it actually does cut depends on 
the context, that is the other system(s) with which it is interacting ± even a steel knife will not cut 
diamond. It is not necessary that the object has been designed to be a knife ± a sharp flint can also cut 
as it has the necessary properties. So here, we have two properties generating a single power. 
We can also have the situation where a single property can lead to different powers depending on 
what the mechanism interacts with. Consider the property of being acidic. Acids are chemicals that 
tend to lose a hydrogen ion in solution; bases tend to gain an ion so there is one emergent property 
(that can be realized in a variety of different chemicals) but it can display different powers. For 
example, acids in the stomach break down food; acid rain destroys the environment; acetic acid 
(vinegar) preserves food; and acids burn the skin. 
Finally, we can have a single property generating a single power, for example the mass of a hammer 
giving it the power to drive in nails. 
8VHGLQWKLVZD\DSRZHULVYHU\VLPLODU WRWKHFRQFHSWRIDQ³DIIRUGDQFH´7KLVWHUPRULJLQDWHG LQ
psychology where Gibson (1977) used it to mean what is offered or provided for someone by an 
object. It have been taken up in IS to describe the opportunities or possibilities provided by a 
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particular technology (Leonardi, 2011; Majchrzak, Faraj, Kane, & Azad, 2013) and Volkoff and 
Strong (2013) and Bygstad et al (2016) have employed the term explicitly in the context of generative 
mechanisms. An affordance is relational as it concerns the relation between the object and the other 
object or actor so an object or technology may have different affordances with different actors. 
$QRWKHUWHUPRIUHOHYDQFHLV³OLDELOLW\´7KLVLVUHDOO\WKHREYHUVHRIDSRZHU,IDNQLIHKDVWKHSRZHU
to cut cheese, then cheese has the liability to be cut by the knife. If the cheese were a suit of armor 
then it would not have that liability at least with respect to the knife. So a liability is a negative power 
± the power to be affected in a particular way by some other causal power. 
4.4. Causal Interactions between levels: Mechanisms in context 
So far we KDYH EHHQ SULPDULO\ FRQFHUQHG ZLWK ZKDW PLJKW EH FDOOHG ³XSZDUG FDXVDWLRQ´ LH WKH
manner in which the structure of a mechanism, its components and their relations, generate the 
properties and powers of the whole. But in many systems, especially social systems, there appears to 
EH³GRZQZDUG´FDXVDWLRQDVZHOO± that is the structure of the whole can affect the behaviors of the 
components. Critical realism clearly accepts this with its concept of holistic causality (this is a 3L 
concept within critical reDOLVP¶V 0(/' IUDPHZRUN (Bhaskar, 1993)) but there are certain issues. 
First, there is a question of logical levels ± can a higher level system interact with its own components 
or can it only interact with other entities at the same level? Second, strong reductionists object since 
they believe that higher level states should always be explicable in terms of lower level ones. And, 
third, it can easily be seen as a form of functionalist explanation which many social scientists see as 
illegitimate. An approach which can overcome these problems is to argue that the states of the system 
as a whole condition or affect the states of the lower level components by enabling or constraining the 
paths of behaviors that they can have without actually determining them.  
Within social science, there are different positions on this, from individualists such as King (1999, 
2000) who argue against the causal effects of social structure, through structurationists such as 
Giddens (1984; Jones & Karsten, 2008)who see a duality of social structure and individual action, to 
realists such as Archer (2003) who see two independent systems in interaction. From the mechanisms 
perspective we would support the realist or at least the structurationist  positions (to the extent there is 
in fact a difference between them (Mingers, 2004)) and can suggest some practical models which help 
in identifying potential mechanisms. 
The first is the macro-micro-macro model developed originally by Coleman (1986). He argued that in 
trying to understand change in social structures it was necessary to identify three distinct causal 
episodes: beginning with macro level social changes which structure micro level interactions between 
people which in turn, at a later date, reproduce or transform the macro level structure. Hedstrom and 
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Swedberg (1996) termed these three types of mechanisms situational, individual action and 
transformational respectively. Astbury and Leeuw (2010) give an example, based on Pawson (2006), 
RI WKH ³QDPLQJ DQG VKDPLQJ´ RI VH[XDO RIIHQGHUV ,Q WKH PDFUR-micro phase, mechanisms such as 
agenda setting and information diffusion raise awareness and increase knowledge of the problem. 
Then in the micro-micro phase, mechanisms such as joined up surveillance by a wide range of citizens 
and officials lead to a greater amount of information about suspicious behavior. Finally, in the micro-
macro stage, it is hoped that opportunity reduction and offender shame will lead to a lessening of the 
objectionable behavior.  
$QRWKHUH[DPSOHLVWKH³WUDJHG\RIWKHFRPPRQV´(Hardin, 1968) which can be seen to apply in many 
ecological and sustainability contexts. At the macro level, a resource is available at little or no cost to 
those who want to use it. Individuals then act at the micro level in their own particular interest using 
the resource. Because there is no overall control, the result is that all of the resource is used up. This 
can be seen in many situations, for example over-fishing, over-use of water reserves or the pollution 
of the atmosphere. 
A more specifically critical realist approach that echoes the macro-micro-PDFUR PRGHO LV $UFKHU¶V
(1995; 2003) morphogenetic model of social action. For Archer, there are two separate but interacting 
systems ± social system and social action. The relationship between the two, unlike in the case of 
Giddens structuration theory, is temporal. What this means is that there is a cycle ± social structure at 
time T1 predates social action at time T2, but then the social action leads to either a change in 
(morphogenesis) or maintenance of (morphostasis) the social structure at time T3. In fact, society is 
seen to consist of two related systems each with its own emergent properties. The structural system is 
based on agential interactions that concern resources while the cultural system is based on interactions 
that concern ideas (Archer, 1988). These are based on structural emergent properties (SEPs) and 
cultural emergent properties (CEPs) respectively. There are, thirdly, the emergent properties of human 
beings (PEPs) (Archer, 2000). 
Thus, at T1 the already existing system provides conditioning for human action in terms of a structure 
of roles, practices and ideas. These enable and constrain activity, but do not determine it. At T2, 
socio-cultural interaction occurs where agents act based partly on the situational logic in which they 
find themselves and partly on their own internal psychological states. Archer (2007) stresses the role 
RIUHIOH[LW\DQGWKH³LQWHUQDOFRQYHUVDWLRQ´LQLQIOXHQFLQJWKHFKRLFHVWKDWDFWRUVPDNH(Mutch, 2010) 
and the reasons why different actors may make different choices within the same situation. Finally, at 
T3, the social action may lead to morphostasis, reinforcing the existing social system, or it could lead 




A third model is discussed by Bhaskar (2014) which recognizes that there may in fact be several 
levels of system involved in a particular contextZKDWLVFDOOHG³ODPLQDWHGV\VWHPV´7KHVHPD\EH
laminated systems conceptualized for a specific situation. For example Bhaskar and Danermark 
(2006) carried out a study of disability and found it necessary to identify seven distinct levels, from 
the physical and biological up to the socio-cultural and normative. Brown (2009), in a study of 
education, employed physical, psychological, socio-cultural and curricula. Similar approaches have 
been used in the study of climate change (Bhaskar, 2010). One obvious consequence of this is the 
need for inter-disciplinary research as these level cross traditional disciplinary boundaries. 
We can also see laminated systems models that are more generic, fRUH[DPSOH%KDVNDU¶V(1993) four-
planar model of social activity. This suggests that all social activity occurs simultaneously in four 
dimensions: i) interactions with the physical and technological world, ii) interactions with other 
people, iii) interactions with the higher level social system, and iv) stratified levels within the 
embodied personality. 
One consequence of the openness of social systems is that in general we will not be able to specify 
how a mechanism will behave without considering its context, that is the other mechanisms that are 
also operating at the same or at different hierarchical levels. So as well as explaining mechanisms in 
terms of the underlying structures that generate them we need to specify the enveloping context or 
field of operations. Considering the two together leads to the output that they produce.  Pawson and 
Tilley (1997) express this in their Context, Mechanism, Output (CMO) model and Bhaskar (2014) 
further developed this to include Structure (CSMO).  In the process of investigating such systems 
there needs to be a constant interplay between retrodiction and retroduction in moving from events 
that are to be explained to potential explanatory mechanisms to possible consequences of those 
hypothetical mechanisms. 
4.5. Absences as causes 
We have mentioned several time the idea that causation is not just positive, i.e., limited to relations 
between positively occurring events or entities. We also maintain the common-sense view that 
absences of either things or events may be causes. This is a FHQWUDOSDUWRI%KDVNDU¶VRQWRORJ\QDPHO\
that reality consists just as much of absences as positive presences (Bhaskar, 1994, pp. 56-57). By 
this, he does not mean things that were believed to exist but actually do not such as phlogiston, but 
rather something which could or should be there but is not. This is not universally accepted ± 
positivism generally only considers real that which actually exists and may be perceived or measured 
while Armstrong (1999, p. 177) DUJXHVWKDW³2PLVVLRQVDQGVRIRUWKDUHQRWSDUWRIWKHUHDOGULYLQJ
force in nature. Every causal situation develops as it does as a result of the presence of positive factors 
DORQH´+RZHYHUZHDUJXHWKDWWKHVKHHUXELTXLW\RIVXFKHYHQWVRU lack thereof) makes it impossible 
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not to accept that absences can be causes. The fire-door not closed worsens the fire; the plant not 
watered dies; the unpaid bill causes the electricity to be cut off; the drought causes people to die.  
It might be objected that this is merely a semantic matter of which state we choose to name and that 
there is in fact symmetricity between the two, but this is not the case. For example, ³baldness´ is 
defined as the absence of hair, EXW³KDLULQHVV´LVQRWGHILQHGDVWKHDEVence of baldness. The norm is 
that there is hair, and so baldness is an absence of the norm or expectation. 
Indeed for Bhaskar, certainly since the development of dialectical critical realism (Bhaskar, 1993), 
absence is as fundamental as presence and he identifies a third fallacy of positivism (after the 
epistemic fallacy and the fallacy of ontological actualism) as being what he calls ontological 
monovalence: 
³In contrast to this, dialectical critical realism argues that absence is constitutively necessary 
for being. A world without absence, without boundaries, punctuations, spaces, and gaps 
between, within and around its objects would be a world in which nothing could have 
determinate form or shape, and in which nothing could move or change, and in which nothing 
FRXOGEHGLIIHUHQWLDWHGRULGHQWLILHG´ 
(Bhaskar, 2010, p. 15) 
However, we have to be careful to restrict our absences in some way. At any time and place there is 
an infinity of events that are not happening and entities that are not present but they only become of 
causal relevance when there is an expectation that they would have been present and their absence 
changes how the world would have been expected or desired to be. It is also the case that in some 
situations an absence is actually necessary ± a sponge needs holes (absence of material) in order to 
soak up water; the vacuum flask need a vacuum (absence of air) to keep warm. We can distinguish a 
VLPSOHDEVHQFHRIDQREMHFWRUHYHQW %KDVNDUFDOOV WKLVD³GH-RQW´DQGDOVRDQDEVHQWLQJDFWLRQ± 
draining flood water for example. Bhaskar (1994) FDOOV WKHVH ³SURGXFW´DQG³SURFHVV´ UHVSHFWLYHO\
For example, the absence of particular functionality or information in an IT system may lead to a 
process of redesign or, conversely, a system may produce too much irrelevant information and action 
may need to be taken to absent this.  
The idea of absences as causes is related to the counterfactual theory of causation (Lewis, 2013). This 
KROGV WKDW LIZHKDYH WZRHYHQWVRU HQWLWLHV$DQG% FDXVDO FODLPV DUHRI WKH IRUP³,I$KDGQRW
occXUUHGWKHQ%ZRXOGQRWKDYHRFFXUUHG´ ,I$LVDQHFHVVDU\DOWKRXJKQRWQHFHVVDULO\VXIILFLHQW
condition for B, then the absence of A can be said to cause the absence of B. Of course, there may be 
other causes of the absence or presence of B as well. This can occur both in terms of events (not 
attending the exam caused not passing the exam) and mechanisms (not having a charged battery 
caused the car not starting) as we will discuss in the next section.   
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This approach is central to the idea of retroduction. In explaining an event we seek hypothetical 
mechanisms that might generate it, but we could also be looking for mechanisms the absence of which 
generates the event, or indeed both. Consider a building catching fire ± we would be interested in both 
mechanisms that triggered the fire ± dropped matches, a faulty appliance ± but also the absence of 
mechanisms which, if they existed, might have put it out ± sprinklers or fire alarms for example. I 
write this just after the dreadful Grenfell tower block fire. It was started by a faulty fridge freezer and 
spread so rapidly because of an absence of sprinklers and the presence of highly flammable cladding. 
5.  Event causality and generative causality: Retroduction 
and retrodiction  
Having discussed the various elements involved - mechanisms, properties, powers, levels and events ± 
we can now put together the whole picture in terms of two forms of causality that are always in play 
together ± event causality and generative causality. In any situation where changes are occurring, 
there will be a series of linked events, one (or more) leading into the next. We can then answer the 
TXHVWLRQ³what caused event Z to KDSSHQ"´LQWHUPVRISUHFHGLQJHYHQWV$%&HWFZKLFKZLOOLQ
varying ways, be necessary or sufficient for the following event(s). This is the basis of Humean 
causation as constant temporal conjunctions of events. However, although this analysis attempts to 
DQVZHU WKH TXHVWLRQ ³ZKDW FDXVHG = WRKDSSHQ´ LW GRHV QRW DQVZHU WKH Zhy question ± why did Z 
happen and not something else? To answer this we have to examine the characteristics and properties 
of the mechanisms that are involved in the events so that we can explain the particular event as 
following from the causal powers of these mechanisms. This is generative or mechanism causality. 
Another way of distinguishing between the two is that event causality is diachronic, the relationship is 
sequential in time, and generative causality is synchronic, properties explain the behaviors at the same 
time. 
This fundamental distinction is essentially the same as that made by Aristotle as efficient/material, 
Salmon (1998) as etiological/constitutive and Bhaskar (1994) in terms of retrodiction/retroduction.  
Within CR, the heart of this is the distinction between the Actual and the Real and the idea that 
mechanisms in the domain of the Real generate events within the domain of the Actual. Another way 
RISXWWLQJWKLVLVWKDWZHQHHGWRWDONDERXWERWK³UHDO´DQG³DFWXDO´FDXVDWLRQ 
³5HDO DQG DFWXDO FDXVDWLRQ ERWK WKHUHIRUH DSSHDU WR EH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI WKH VDPH JHQHULF
type of structural relation: the (diachronic) causal consequences that flow from a given set of 
HQWLWLHVH[LVWLQJV\QFKURQLFDOO\LQDJLYHQVHWRIUHODWLRQVWRHDFKRWKHU´{Elder-Vass, 2005 




Real causation involves the powers and tendencies that complex mechanisms embody whether these 
are actually realized on any particular occasion, or whether they are counteracted by some other 
mechanism. These are the properties and powers that we have analyzed above as emergent from the 
PHFKDQLVPV¶ VWUXFWXUH 0HFKDQLVPV KDYH WKHVH SRZHUV ZKHWKHU RU QRW WKH\ DUH DFWXDOL]HG DQG
whether or not they are observed.  
In contrast, actual, or event, causation concerns the relationships over time between one event and 
another. This form of causality (at least in the social world) is never determinate but always multiple 
and contingent ± the unpredictable outcome of a range of interacting mechanisms at different levels. 
This is where laboratory science is different since in the lab it is possible to control many of the 
extraneous factors and set up constant conjunctions of events such that X is always followed by Y 
since there is nothing to interfere with it or countervail it.  
Thus, events in the real world happen, or do not happen, through the interaction of a variety of 
different causal mechanisms, each with their particular causal powers and liabilities. However, as we 
have seen, mechanisms are composed of components and while mechanisms have a domain of 
interactions as a whole, they also interact with each other, at the same time, through their components. 
So, when I meet someone I respond to them as myself and as themselves (as wholes) but I also shake 
their hand and smile with my face, and perhaps sub-consciously notice something (sub-conscious) 
about their body language. All of these complex interactions, at different hierarchical levels, come 
together to generate the actual event that occurs.  
Within the CR tradition the main inferential method has been retroduction, which is what we have 
called generative causality. However, Bhaskar has also used the term retrodiction (as contrasted 
perhaps with prediction), for example in RRREIC, to mean what we have termed event causation. 
Retroduction can be particularly aligned with theoretical research where we have a lack of 
explanatory knowledge in a particular context and are trying to discover the underlying causal 
mechanisms generating the phenomena of interest. Retrodiction is more applicable in applied settings 
where we do have some understanding of the mechanisms in play and want to use them as part of a 
causal account of why certain events have or have not happened.  
³:H HQJDJH LQ UHWURGXFWLRQ ZKHQ ZH DUH UHODWLYHO\ LJQRUDQW DERXW WKH PHFKDQLVPV LQ
operation that are cDXVLQJ WKH SKHQRPHQD XQGHU LQYHVWLJDWLRQ « 5HWURGXFWLRQ XVXDOO\
LQYROYHVDVNLQJDVSHFLILFNLQGRITXHVWLRQ µZKDW WKLQJ LI LW H[LVWHGPLJKWDFFRXQW IRU WKH
H[LVWHQFH RI 3"¶ « 7KHUH DUH WLPHV KRZHYHU ZKHQ ZH DUH QRW LJQRUDQW EXW UHODWLYHO\
knowledgeable of the mechanisms in operation that are causing the phenomena under 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQ « ,Q WKLV FDVH ZH XVH H[LVWLQJ WKHRULHV REVHUYDWLRQV FODLPV DQG RWKHU
knowledge to retrodict, that is, make claims about the way these mechanisms tend to operate 





(Fleetwood & Hesketh, 2010, p. 243) 
We should not see these two inferential approaches as alternatives ± one or the other ± for in many 
situations, especially in the open world of the social sciences, we may be trying to do both by 
generating new knowledge as well as applying it to a particular context (Steinmetz, 1998). 
³In such circumstances the applied explanatory task of discovering antecedent states of 
affairs, involving retrodiction, will have to go hand-in-hand with the explanatory theoretical 
task of discovering the nature of the relatively enduring generative mechanisms at work, 
involving retroduction.´  
(Bhaskar, 2010, p. 6) 
Moreover, the task of social explanation can develop into an action-oriented mode of research (action 
research) with the aim of bringing about improvements to social and organizational situations ± a 
process of learning about and changing the world (Bhaskar, 2014, p. ix) 
To illustrate the argument simply let us imagine a scenario ± Bob is in the kitchen and puts down a 
glass vase on the worktop; Sue is unaware of this and turns round, knocking into the vase; the vase 
falls to the floor and breaks.  
We can begin by looking at this diachronically. We can see the whole as a single event ± the vase 
getting broken ± but we can also split it into several separate but related sub-events. Although this 
split is to some extent arbitrary, nevertheless it is possible because we can see that each sub-event 
could have had a different outcome, and that if it had the result would have been different. In this case 
we could split it into four sub-events: putting down the vase, turning round, knocking the vase, and it 
falling to the floor and breaking. Each of these sub-events could have had a different outcome. Bob 
could have put the vase down loudly so that Sue knew it was there; he could have put it in another 
place out of range; Sue could have moved differently and so not come into contact with the vase; it 
might not have been a vase she came into contact with but the kettle which would not fall off; Sue 
might have caught the vase; it might not have broken; if the vase had been a rubber ball it would have 
bounced; if it had been a sharp knife it might have cut Sue and so on.  
What we can see here is a series of events each one of which sets up the conditions for the next one 
but does not wholly determine what the next one will be. The conjunction of all four of the events is a 
sufficient cause of the vase breaking (assuming no other countervailing events have occurred) but it is 
not a necessary cause as something else could have caused it to break, say a cat jumping on the 
worktop. In terms of the individual events, we can see that one event does not cause, in the sense of 
determine, the next event. Rather, it sets up the conditions for the next interaction, but what actually 
happens depends both on the conditions, and the properties and powers of the interacting systems. 
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Synchronically, we can see that at each event particular systems interact, both as wholes and parts, 
and generate a particular outcome, which could always have been different. Thus, in event 1 the vase 
was placed at a particular position, and in such a way that it made little noise. Had it been put down in 
a different place, or more noisily, the later outcomes might not have occurred. When the vase fell off, 
it broke because of its relative fragility and the force of collision. Had it been made of a different 
material, or fallen from a lower height the outcome again might have been different. 
In each case, we can see that the result is nothing other than a change on the configuration of the 
systems involved, whether that is a spatial change or, in the case of the vase, disintegration. The 
events are changes to the mechanisms which are, relatively speaking, more enduring. 
These distinctions are summarized in Table 2. 
 
 




5.1. Abstracting causal relations ± Demi-Regs 
Many of the examples of critical realist research are based on explaining the events in a single, or 
perhaps small number, of case studies. In addition, generally the CR approach does favor this with the 
emphasis on explanation not prediction, open systems and an antipathy towards constant conjunctions 
and universal laws. However, much of science, and potentially social science, is rightfully concerned 
with generalizing from particular instances to regular occurrences. In answering a question such as 
³ZKDW FDXVHV FDQFHU"´ZHDUHPRUH LQWHUHVWHG LQ IDFWRUV WKDWJHQHUDWHRUSHUKDSVSUHYHQWFDQFHU in 
general than in why patient X got cancer.  
Within CR, the main person to consider this is Lawson (1997, p. 204), in economics, who uses the 
FRQFHSWRI³GHPL-UHJXODULWLHV´RUGHPL-regs, which are: 
 ³D SDUWLDO HYHQW UHJXODULW\ ZKLFK SULPD IDFLH LQGLFDWHV WKH RFFDVLRQDO EXW OHVV WKDQ




So we are looking at a regularity that occurs over time and/or space. This could be caused by a single 
mechanism that exercises its powers regularly, for example the tide or the seasons, or it could be 
through a number of mechanisms that regularly interact in the same way for example daily traffic 
jams at rush hour. Or, it may be that is does not occur regularly but only whenever the right 
circumstances apply to trigger it. The question then arises as to how can we identify such patterns, and 
then generate potential causal explanations. If the situation is one where quantitative data may be 
produced then this brings in to play the role of statistics in critical realism (Mingers, 2006). 
So far we have contrasted generative causality with the Humean view which actually underpins 
modern statistics. As we are all taught, correlation only implies association and not causation ± there 
may be many reasons other than direct causation as to why two variables are associated in their values 
± and most statistical analysis remains in the domain of the empirical without venturing into the 
underlying domain of real causation. This has tended to give the impression that CR is actually 
antithetical to statistical modelling (Bhaskar, 1979; Lawson, 1997; Manicas, 1998; Porpora, 1998; 
Ron, 1999) although others have argued that it is not (Mingers, 2006; Pratschke, 2003).  
However, there have been significant attempts  to make the move from traditional statistical causality 
to generative statistical causality and the basic position adopted, for example by Pearl (2000, 2009), 
Woodward (2003) and Morgan and Winship (2007), is quite similar to our account of generative 
mechanisms. Pearl has made this transition personally:  
³7HQ \HDUV DJR , ZDV ZRUNLQJ LQ WKH HPSLULFLVW WUDGLWLRQ ,Q WKLV WUDGLWLRn, probabilistic 
relationships [e.g. correlation, JM]  constitute the foundations of human knowledge, whereas 
causality simply provides useful ways of abbreviating and organizing. Today my view is quite 
different. I now take causal relationships to be the fundamental building blocks both of 
SK\VLFDOUHDOLW\DQGRIKXPDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ´ (Pearl, 2000, p. xiii)  
 
And his formal position is very clearly stated:  
³1DWXUH SRVVHVVHV VWDEOH FDXVDO PHFKDQLVPV WKDW RQ D GHWDLOHG OHYHO RI GHVFULSWLRQV DUH
deterministic functional relationships between variables, some of which are unobservable´
(Pearl, 2000, p. 43) 
 
This tradition is actually not so recent, see for example Wright (1921), who first developed the idea of 
path coefficients in regression, and Haavelmo (1943), one of the founders of structural equation 
modelling. The specific idea here is to go from networks of relationships between variables, some 
observed and measured and some potentially unobservable, to deduce rigorously what must be the 
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underlying mechanistic structure generating the observed network. The first step generally is to 
represent the network of potential causal effects graphically in a form of influence diagram. The 
relationships may be based both on observations and also prior theory. Within the graph, nodes 
represent variables and arrows represent a variety of possible causal links ± one-directional, bi-
directional or underlying unobserved causal links affecting several nodes. In most analyzed cases the 
graph is directional in that some variables precede others, and does not cycle back on itself. Such a 
directional acyclic graph is called a DAG.  
Overall this approach provides an interesting potential link between social mechanisms and more 
traditional forms of statistical modelling although there are clearly distinct problems. The first is that 
it is limited to variables that can be measured quantitatively with some form of functional or statistical 
relationship. The social world, being based on meaning, can often not be quantified or fitted neatly 
LQWRD'$*7KHVHFRQGSDUWLFXODUO\ZLWK:RRGZDUG¶V(2003) manipulationist approach, is that it is 
much more epistemic than ontological ± it concerns our causal explanations and how we might know 
there is a causal influence rather than whether there actually is one.  
6.  Analysis of empirical studies 
In this section we will analyses a range of empirical case studies that have explicitly used critical 
realism to see to what extent they utilize the concepts we have discussed above. The studies have been 
found from Google Scholar seaUFKHVIRU³FULWLFDOUHDOLVP´RU³FULWLFDOUHDOLVW´LQMRXUQDOVWKDWFRQWDLQ
³LQIRUPDWLRQ´LQWKHWLWOH2QO\SDSHUVZLWKDFWXDOHPSLULFDOFDVHVKDYHEHHQLQFOXGHGThe results are 
summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Events 
The studies all analyze particular situations, as opposed to discovering general laws, but they cover a 
wide range from individual organizations to the adoption of broadband in rural areas to the 
development of ICT capabilities in a whole country. In each case they describe a series of events that 
needs explaining. These are very varied in timescale from a year or so to over 40 years which 




Each study then discussed possible causal mechanisms generating the events although they differed in 
the degree of specificity and detail. Some, such as Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) and Williams and 
Karahanna (2013) were explicit in identifying and describing specific mechanisms; others such as 
Njihia and Merali (2013) were more generic, in this case drawing extensively on  mechanisms in 
$UFKHU¶V PRUSKRJHQHWLF WKHRU\ (Archer, 1995; Archer, 2003). 6HYHUDO SDSHUV XVHG $UFKHU¶V WKHRU\
and often, when they did, they tended not to use the term mechanism.  
To give some examples of particular mechanisms: Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) studied the rapid 
and successful development of a digital infrastructure within a Norwegian airline. They identified 
three mechanisms underlying this success ± an innovation mechanism to generate new uses; an 
adoption mechanisms to encourage the take-up of the capabilities; and a scaling mechanism to allow 
for their rapid growth. Moreover, these mechanisms were also found to be present in a survey of other 
case studies of digital infrastructure. Williams and Karahanna (2013) studied the efforts that a large 
organization set up to help it coordinate its IT activities by way of a standing committee of business 
and IT managers, and an ad-hoc business process analysis task group. They hypothesized two 
mechanisms to explain the outcomes, a unit aligning mechanism at the macro-micro level and a 
consensus making one at the micro-micro level. 
Several studies took a particular piece of software as the basic mechanism with the particular powers, 
affordances and liabilities that it brought as the explanatory factor. Zachariadis et al (2013) studied the 
adoption of the SWIFT inter-banking system over 30 years from 1973. SWIFT was a system for 
enabling inter-bank operations and was gradually adopted first by large banks and then by smaller 
banks. It had a range or powers and liabilities, for example it enhanced automation, speeded 
transactions and had effects on governance, but also needed to be aligned with other operations and 
was confined to the existing network. Volkoff et al (2007) studied the implementation of SAP within 
a large organization. They came to the view that the primary form of mechanism that generated 
change in practices was the embedding of routines into the software which in turn gave them a 
materiality beyond cognitions or practices. The most important components to be embedded were 
routines, data and roles. By being embedded in the software they became both more fixed and 
inflexible, and also more transparent and exposed. This led to changes in the way the organization 
worked, and these eventually in structural changes. In a later paper (Volkoff & Strong, 2013), these 
effects were analyzed in terms of the theory of affordances. 
Aaltonen and Tempini (2014) looked at the way in which very low level communication data 
automatically recorded in a system could be developed into usable marketing information defining a 
particular advertising audience. Three mechanisms were identified at different levels ± the semantic 
closure mechanisms, embedded in the technology, produced stable metrics concerning user activity; 
the pattern-finding mechanism, at the level of database and statistical packages, identified relevant 
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patterns in the metrics; and the framing mechanism, enacted by the managers, constructed scenarios 
and frames around the information to make it relevant and actionable. The approach largely involved 
retroduction rather than retrodiction.  
The idea that large amounts of very low-level data could open up spaces of possibility for higher 
levels of emergence was also picked up in Iannacci¶V (2014) research into police-prosecutor routines. 
Iannacci (2014) did not speFLILFDOO\XVHWKHWHUP³PHFKDQLVPV´EXWLW LVFOHDUWKDW the analysis took 
routines as mechanisms that generated patterned sets of behavior in the interactions between police 
and prosecutors. It also took both IT and legislative artefacts as mechanisms that structured the 
routines. In fact, the situation is complex since the two types of artefacts interact with each other 
although they are at different levels in the analysis ± IT is at the micro level, legislation is at the macro 
level. Changes in the IT artefacts triggered legislative changes to include technological interactions, 
and legislative requirements caused changes to the IT systems.  
Levels of analysis 
,QWHUPVRIGLIIHUHQWOHYHOVRIDQDO\VLVVHYHUDOSDSHUVH[SOLFLWO\UHIHUUHGWR&ROHPDQ¶V(1986) macro-
micro-macro model, DQG $UFKHU¶V PRUSKRJHQHWLF F\FOH ZKLFK LV HVVHQWLDOO\ FRPPHQVXUDWH ZLWK
Coleman) was also commonly used. )RUH[DPSOH'REVRQHWDO¶VDQDO\VLVRIIDLOHGEURDGEDQGWDNH-up 
analyzed mechanisms at three levels ± Government and Federal regulatory initiatives, a particular 
organization created through these initiatives, and the social interactions at community level. Using 
morphogenesis, the study showed that structures at the organizational level such as social networking 
software conditioned the social activity at the individual level but this, in actuality, led to the rejection 
of the software (morphogenesis) and a reproduction of the country way of life (morphostasis). Mirani 
XVHG $UFKHU¶V PRGHOV RI ERWK VWUXFWXUDO DQG FXOWXUDO FRQGLWLRQLQJ WR H[DPLQH WKUHH phases of the 
GHYHORSPHQW RI D ILQDQFH FRPSDQ\¶V UHODWLRQV WR external, offshore IT suppliers. At each stage the 
prior structural and cultural conditions generated particular sets of actions which in turn led to later 
structural changes. One of the lessons was that many of the problems were due to a lack of 
recognition of the cultural differences rather than structural ones.  
Absence as cause 
Consideration of absences as causes was limited in the papers, most not considering it. Of those that 
did, Njihia and Merali considered the common idea within development studies that lack of resources 
is one of the main inhibitors of progress but actually concluded that paying attention to what exists 
within developing countries in terms of local expertise, adaptive capabilities and needs is equally 
important. Dobson et al were not so much concerned with absence as a cause, but with absence as an 
effect ± their question was, what was the cause of a lack of take-up of broadband just where you 
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might expect it to be welcomed? Looking to the future, one could see that the absence of take-up may 
well have negative effects in the future in an increasingly networked world. 
Event and generative causation 
All of the papers were concerned with the interactions of events and mechanisms, and particularly the 
way in which certain events can lead to or inhibit the later activation of particular mechanisms, which 
in turn then engender future events. And most pointed out the extent to which the activation or effects 
of particular mechanisms was dependent on the presence or absence of other mechanisms. Many of 
WKHSDSHUVXVHG3DZVRQDQG7LOO\¶V(1997) context, mechanisms, output (CMO) model to show how 
the outputs produced or not produced by a mechanism depended on its context. 
However, none of the papers mentioned explicitly the distinction between retroduction and 
retrodiction although they often talked of retroduction and generally they also looked at sequences of 
events. I think that the explanation for this is that retroduction is a well-known concept, both from CR 
DQGIURPHOVHZKHUHDQGLWDSSHDUHGHDUO\RQLQ%KDVNDU¶VZULWLQJEXWUHWURGLFWLRQLVDPRUHREVFXUH
term that has not figured so highly in the literature. Although it was mentioned in some of the earlier 
works there was little discussion of it. However, with more recent books actually applying the theory, 
such as Bhaskar et al (2010), Fleetwood and Hesketh (2010) and Edwards et al (2014) this should 
change and it certainly seems like a valuable distinction.  
Generalization 
Finally, two of the studies did make some attempt to abstract more general relationships. Henfridsson 
and Bygstad (2013 ) identified three causal mechanisms in their initial case study but then went on to 
look at 41 similar cases in the literature and were often able to identify the same mechanisms and to 
show that they only generated success if they occurred together.  Zachariadis et al (2013) were 
examining the take-up and effects of the adoption of SWIFT in a large sample of banks. Through the 
initial, intensive, analytical work they were able to understand the ways in which the powers and 
liabilities of SWIFT might play out in different kinds of banks, e.g., large/small or early/late adopters. 
This enabled them to search for and find particular patterns of demi-regs in their data concerning the 
relationship between SWIFT adoption and successful performance. 
Table 3 also shows the research methods employed in the studies. All of them were essentially 
intensive, relying on interviews, observation and participant observation. Various coding schemes 
were used in the analysis of the data, generally based on some form of grounded theory. But, this was 
generally supplemented by explicit theory as well. One study, Zachariadis et al (2013), explicitly used 
multimethodology as it also incorporated statistical analysis and econometrics. 
30 
 
7.  Conclusions 
The nature of causality has been little discussed in social science, more specifically in management 
and IS research, which is very unfortunate since it is so central in trying to explain the occurrences of 
the organizational world. To summarize crudely, positivists have relied on a Humean view of 
causation in terms of constant conjunctions of events that can be analyzed statistically in an effort to 
discover general laws. The problem with this is that it remains at the empirical level of associations 
and statistical patterns ± what happens ± without being able to explain why it happens. Interpretivists 
reject this approach on the grounds that human action is always situated, meaningful and reliant on 
social constructions. The problem here is that causality becomes confined to our personal or social 
explanations of events, whether by lay people or researchers, rather than being granted ontological 
status. 
In this paper we have argued for a third approach to causality that is being developed within a variety 
of disciplines including the philosophy of science, sociology, systems theory and critical realism. This 
view posits that the events that occur in the world, some of which we experience and then try to 
explain, come about as a result of the interplay of various mechanisms that exist and interact with 
each other. These mechanisms may be physical, social or conceptual, and may be observable or 
unobservable except through their effects. In particular, we have elaborated on the critical realist view 
of mechanisms since we believe that this provides the most thorough and consistent articulation of a 
mechanisms-based approach. The main benefits are: an important distinction between the domains of 
real, the actual and the empirical; a recognition of two intertwined forms of causality ± event causality 
and generative causality ± and correspondingly retrodiction and retroduction; an acceptance of the 
double hermeneutic of interpretivism; and an acknowledgement of the plurality of types of 
mechanisms and corresponding forms of research methods. 
The specific contributions of the paper have been to develop more fully a range of concepts involved 
in the mechanisms approach ± events, emergent properties, properties and powers, absences as causes, 
levels of interaction and mechanisms in context, and abstracting causal relations or demi-regs. And to 
then demonstrate these in a range of empirical case studies of information systems technology in 
organizations. 
This hopefully clears the ground for future research into causal mechanisms which are harder to 
clearly identify in the social sciences than in the physical sciences. In particular, guidance would be 
valuable on how to identify possible causal mechanisms, how to deal with a variety of different levels 
of causality for example social, group, individual, psychological; how to deal with issues of multiple 
interpretation and understanding; whether generic mechanisms that recur in many situations can be 
identified; whether particular forms of social theRU\ IRU H[DPSOH $UFKHU¶V PRUSKRJHQHVLV RU
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*LGGHQV¶ VWUXFWXUDWLRQ DUH KHOSIXO RU KRZ PDWHULDO DQG WHFKQRORJLFDO PHFKDQLVPV LQWHUDFW ZLWK
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